American Airlines Flight 11:Timeline
This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. It is classified as a stub, and categories require improvement. Category:Content September 11 6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m. Hijackers Arrive at Airports and Board Flights; Computer Screening Program Fails to Stop Them All the alleged 9/11 hijackers reportedly check in at the airports from where they board Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93. 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 27, 89, 93 ] Since 1998, the FAA has required air carriers to implement a program called the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4/1/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; US CONGRESS, 3/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 2, 85 According to the 9/11 Commission, nine of the 19 hijackers are flagged by the CAPPS system before boarding Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93. POST, 1/28/2004; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, A/K/A SHAQIL, A/K/A ABU KHALID AL SAHRAWI, DEFENDANT, 3/6/2006In addition, Mohamed Atta was selected when he checked in at the airport in Portland, for his earlier connecting flight to Boston (see 5:33 a.m.-5:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). All of the hijackers subsequently pass through security checkpoints before boarding their flights. 6:45 a.m. Hijacker’s Connecting Flight Arrives in Boston Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari’s Portland-Boston flight arrives on time at Boston’s Logan Airport. SPIEGEL, 2002 They cross a parking lot on their way to the departure terminal for Flight 11, and are observed asking for directions. The other three Flight 11 hijackers arrive at Logan in a rented car around this same time (see (6:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 5 6:45 a.m.-7:40 a.m. Three Flight 11 Hijackers Selected for Additional Screening When They Pass through Airport Security During this period, all five Flight 11 hijackers check in at Boston’s Logan Airport and board their plane, bound for Los Angeles. Ticket records will show that CAPPS selects three of the Flight 11 hijackers at Logan: Since Waleed Alshehri checks no bags his selection has no consequences; Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami have their bags scanned for explosives, but are not stopped. All five hijackers would need to pass through a security checkpoint to reach the departure gate for their flight. Each would have been screened as they walked through a metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a small-caliber handgun. If they’d set this off, they would have been screened with a handheld metal detector. An X-ray machine would have screened their carry-on luggage. However, Logan Airport has no video surveillance of its security checkpoints (see 1991-2000), so there is no documentary evidence of exactly when they pass through them, or if alarms are triggered. According to the 9/11 Commission, none of the checkpoint supervisors later recall seeing any of the Flights 11 hijackers, or report anything suspicious having occurred. COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 1-2; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 5-6 However, a WorldNetDaily article will claim that some Logan staff members recall seeing Mohamed Atta (see (6:50 a.m.-7:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 9/21/2001 The Boston Globe will later comment, “aviation specialists have said it is unlikely that more rigorous attention to existing rules would have thwarted the 10 hijackers who boarded two jets at Logan on Sept. 11. At the time, the knives and box-cutters they were carrying were permitted.” GLOBE, 10/17/2001 6:50 a.m.-7:40 a.m. Mohamed Atta Observed at Logan Airport Running Late for Plane? According to an article on WorldNetDaily, alleged lead hijacker Mohamed Atta almost misses Flight 11 and has to rush to the departure gate at Boston’s Logan Airport. The article is based on the account of an unnamed American Airlines employee at Logan, and claims Atta is running late because his connecting flight from Portland was delayed (see (6:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission claims that this plane was “on time,” and says Atta is observed at Logan with Abdulaziz Alomari, asking for directions in a parking lot (see 6:45 a.m.). The employee says that at the baggage check-in, when asked security questions, Atta claims he does not speak English. A supervisor is called for, who just sends him towards the departure gate, as it is close to his plane’s take-off time. Atta rushes through the security checkpoint, then down to the gate, where he shows up perspiring. The employee comments, “The nitwit. You know, they’d been planning it for five years, and he’s running late for the flight.” An American Airlines spokeswoman will refuse to comment on this account, saying all American employees have been ordered not to speak to the press. 9/21/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 3, 5 6:52 a.m.-6:55 a.m. A three-minute call is made from a payphone at Logan Airport, in the gate area from where Flight 175 will later depart, to Mohamed Atta’s cell phone. The 9/11 Commission will report, “We presume Shehhi [[Marwan Alshehhi]] made the call, but we cannot be sure.” According to the commission, this is Atta and Alshehhi’s final conversation. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 1, 451; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 4 According to other reports, though, they later speak again briefly by cellphone while waiting for their planes to take off (see (Before 7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). YORK TIMES, 11/4/2001; TIME, 8/4/2002 7:00 a.m.-7:45 a.m. Computer Screening Program Selects Some Hijackers; Fails to Stop Them Sometime during this period, the hijackers pass through airport security checkpoints at the various airports. CAPPS selects three of the five Flight 11 hijackers. Since Waleed Alshehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami have their bags scanned for explosives, but are not stopped.COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; BALTIMORE SUN, 1/27/2004 7:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Gate Agent Asks If Atta’s Luggage Has Been Loaded onto Flight 11 A gate agent at Logan Airport calls Donald Bennett, the crew chief for Flight 11, and asks him if the two suitcases of a passenger who has just boarded the plane have arrived from US Airways. Bennett replies that the suitcases, which belong to lead hijacker Mohamed Atta, have arrived, but Flight 11’s baggage compartment has already been locked for departure, so they will not be loaded. Atta flew from Portland to Boston on a Colgan Air flight operated for US Airways (see (6:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). American Airlines baggage expediter Philip Depasquale will later claim that bags from US Airways are always late, and so this problem is a common occurrence. The luggage is turned over to Depasquale to have it sent to Los Angeles on another flight. According to Salvatore Misuraca, a ramp service manager for American Airlines at Logan Airport, gate agents do not usually call about a bag unless the passenger that owns it has specifically asked about it, to ensure that their bags have been put on their flight. Atta’s luggage will remain at Logan Airport and be found after the attacks, revealing important clues (see September 11-13, 2001). BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/10/2004 Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 158 passengers, is about half full on this day, with 81 passengers on board (including the five hijackers), along with the two pilots and nine flight attendants. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 6 7:40 a.m. Flight 11 pushes back from the gate at Logan Airport. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 2 There are discrepancies over which gate it leaves from. Most early reports state that it pushes out from Gate 26 in Terminal B of the airport. GLOBE, 9/12/2001; CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 9/13/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; BERNSTEIN, 2002, PP. 179; DER SPIEGEL, 2002, PP. 36 However, one unnamed Logan Airport employee will say it leaves from Gate 32, also in Terminal B. GLOBE, 9/11/2001 The transcript of radio communications with the flight confirms it left from Gate 32, and the 9/11 Commission also later states this. YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 451 The reason for the discrepancy in these reports is unclear.It will take off at 7:59 (see (7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 4 Before 7:59 a.m. Mohamed Atta on Flight 11 calls Marwan Alshehhi in Flight 175 as both planes sit on the runway. They presumably confirm the plot is on. 8/4/2002 7:45 a.m. Flight 11 is scheduled to depart at 7:45, but instead takes of 14 minutes later.POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ABC NEWS, 7/18/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari board Flight 11. Atta’s bags are not loaded onto the plane in time and are later found by investigators. Investigators later find airline uniforms and many other remarkable items. GLOBE, 9/18/2001 It is later reported that at least two other hijackers on Flight 11 use stolen uniforms and IDs to board the plane. HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/16/2001 7:59 a.m. Flight 11 takes off from Logan Airport, 14 minutes after its scheduled 7:45 departure time. POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ABC NEWS, 7/18/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 After 8am 8:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Makes Its Last Communication with Air Traffic Control The last routine communication takes place between air traffic control and the pilots of Flight 11 at 8:13 and 29 seconds. Boston Center air traffic controller Pete Zalewski is handling the flight, and instructs it to turn 20 degrees to the right. Pilot John Ogonowski immediately acknowledges the instruction, but seconds later he fails to respond to a command to climb to 35,000 feet. Zalewski repeatedly tries to reach the pilot over the next ten minutes, even using the emergency frequency, but gets no response (see 8:14 a.m.-8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission concludes that Flight 11 is hijacked at 8:14, or shortly afterwards (see 8:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 4 (Between 8:13 a.m. and 8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Transponder Turned Off Shortly after air traffic controllers ask Flight 11 to climb to 35,000 feet, its transponder stops transmitting. Flight control manager Glenn Michael later says, “We considered it at that time to be a possible hijacking.” SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/15/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/12/2002 Initial stories after 9/11 suggest the transponder is turned off around 8:13 a.m., but Pete Zalewski, the air traffic controller handling the flight, later says the transponder is turned off at 8:20 a.m. 9/11/2002 The 9/11 Commission places it at 8:21 a.m. COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, claims the transponder is turned off some time after 8:30 a.m. where the Flight 11 hijack was first detected a.m. NEWS, 9/11/2002 (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pilots of All Four Hijacked Planes Fail to Dial Standard Distress Code In the event of a hijacking, all airline pilots are trained to key an emergency four-digit code into their plane’s transponder. This would surreptitiously alert air traffic controllers, causing the letters “HJCK” to appear on their screens. 9/13/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/13/2001; NEWS (PORTUGAL), 8/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17-18 The action, which pilots should take the moment a hijack situation is known, only takes seconds to perform. SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001 Yet during the hijackings of flights 11, 175, 77, and 93, none of the pilots do this. 9/11/2001 8:14 a.m.-8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Controller Repeatedly Tries to Contact Flight 11 After Flight 11 fails to respond to an instruction from air traffic control to climb to 35,000 feet (see 8:13 a.m. September 11, 2001), the controller handling it, Pete Zalewski, tries to regain contact with the aircraft. Over the following ten minutes, he makes numerous attempts but without success. (Zalewski says he makes 12 attempts; the 9/11 Commission says nine.) He tries reaching the pilot on the emergency frequency. Zalewski later recalls that initially, But as Zalewski is repeatedly unable to get any response from Flight 11, he recalls, “I even began to get more concerned.” However, Zalewski claims, it is not until he sees the plane’s transponder go off at around 8:21 that he suspects something is “seriously wrong,” and calls his supervisor for assistance (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). And it is not until about 8:25 that he realizes for sure that he is dealing with a hijacking (see (8:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It is only then that Boston Center starts notifying its chain of command that Flight 11 has been hijacked (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 18; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 7 AND 10-11 8:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Is Hijacked, but Pilot Makes No Distress Call The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that Flight 11 is hijacked at 8:14 or shortly after. It will state, Pilots are trained to handle hijackings by staying calm, complying with any requests, and, if possible, dialing an emergency four-digit code on their plane’s transponder. It only takes a few seconds to dial this code. 9/12/2001 Yet, as the Boston Globe notes, “It appears that the hijackers’ entry was surprising enough that the pilots did not have a chance to broadcast a traditional distress call” (see (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). GLOBE, 11/23/2001 The Los Angeles Times reports that, when flight attendant Amy Sweeney makes a phone call from the plane, she says the hijackers have “just gained access to the cockpit.” ANGELES TIMES, 9/20/2001 Yet her first attempted call is not until 8:22, and, according to official accounts, her first call that stays connected is at 8:25, well past when the 9/11 Commission says the hijacker takeover occurs. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9-10 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 According to an employee at the FAA’s Boston Center, Flight 11 is hijacked while it is over Gardner, Massachusetts, about 45 miles northwest of Boston. PRESS, 9/13/2001; TELEGRAPH (NASHUA), 9/13/2001 (After 8:14 a.m.-8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Pilot Repeatedly Pushes Talk Back Button At some unknown point after the hijacking begins, Flight 11’s talkback button is activated, which enables Boston flight controllers to hear what is being said in the cockpit. It is unclear whether John Ogonowski, the pilot, activates the talkback button, or whether a hijacker accidentally does so when he takes over the cockpit. A controller later says, “The button is being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York.” An article later notes that “his ability to do so also indicates that he is in the driver’s seat much of the way” to the WTC. Such transmissions continue until about 8:38 a.m. SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/15/2001 However, Ogonowski fails to punch a four-digit emergency code into the plane’s transponder, which pilots are taught to do the moment a hijack situation is known (see (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/13/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001 (8:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight Controllers Cannot Contact Flight 11 Two Boston flight controllers, Pete Zalewski and Lino Martins, discuss the fact that Flight 11 cannot be contacted. Zalewski says to Martins, “He won’t answer you. He’s nordo radio roger thanks.” 9/17/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002 (8:16 a.m.-8:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Four Calls Made From Flight 11 by Unknown Individual, Possibly Flight Attendant Sara Low According to a computer presentation put forward as evidence in the 2006 trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, an unknown person—or persons—makes four calls from Flight 11. These are at 08:16:50, 08:20:11, 08:25:31, and 08:28:33. The calls do not appear to have gone through properly: they are each described as “On button pressed, no call made.” Though the trial exhibit identifies the caller(s) only as “Unknown Caller,” other evidence suggests that at least one of the calls is made by—or on behalf of—Sara Low, who is one of the plane’s flight attendants. Her father, Mike Low, later says he learned from FBI records that his daughter had given her childhood home phone number in Arkansas to another of the flight attendants, Amy Sweeney, for her to report the hijacking. Low speculates that the reason his daughter gave this particular number was that she had just moved home, and so, in the stress of the hijacking, her childhood phone number was the only one she could remember. The Moussaoui trial presentation lists Sweeney as making five calls from the plane. However, it says these are all to the American Airlines office at Boston’s Logan Airport. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/4/2007 Sara Low lets Sweeney use her father’s calling card in order to make these five calls from an Airfone (see 8:22 a.m. September 11, 2001). YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Attendant Ong Phones in Hijack Report, Officials Doubt Validity Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong calls Vanessa Minter, an American Airlines reservations agent at its Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, using a seatback Airfone from the back of the plane. Ong speaks to Minter and another employee, Winston Sadler, for about two minutes. Then, at 8:21 a.m., supervisor Nydia Gonzalez is patched in to the call as well. Ong says, “The cockpit’s not answering. Somebody’s stabbed in business class and… I think there’s mace… that we can’t breathe. I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.” Asked what flight she is on, she mistakenly answers, “Flight 12,” though a minute later she corrects this, saying, “I’m number three on Flight 11.” She continues, “And the cockpit is not answering their phone. And there’s somebody stabbed in business class. And there’s… we can’t breathe in business class. Somebody’s got mace or something… I’m sitting in the back. Somebody’s coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second, they’re coming back.” As this quote shows, other flight attendants relay information from the front of the airplane to Ong sitting in the back, and she periodically waits for updates. She goes on, “I think the guys are up there the cockpit. They might have gone there—jammed the way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can’t even get inside.” Ong’s emergency call will last about 25 minutes, being cut off around 8:44 a.m. (see (8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the recently installed recording system at the American Airlines reservations center contains a default time limit, and consequently only the first four minutes of it will be recorded. Gonzalez later testifies that Ong was “calm, professional and in control” all through the call. ONG, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 5 AND 453; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 8-9 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey, who will hear more recordings than are made public, later says that some officials on the ground greeted Ong’s account skeptically: “They did not believe her. They said, ‘Are you sure?’ They asked her to confirm that it wasn’t air-rage. Our people on the ground were not prepared for a hijacking.” YORK TIMES, 4/18/2004 SOURCES: BOB KERREY 8:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Dispatcher Learns of Problem With Flight 11 At the American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, the flight dispatcher responsible for transatlantic flights receives a communication from an American Airlines flight traveling from Seattle to Boston, informing her that air traffic control has asked the aircraft to try and contact Flight 11. Under FAA rules, dispatchers licensed by the agency are responsible for following aircraft in flight. Once a plane is in the air, a dispatcher must monitor its progress, relay safety information to the captain, and handle any problems. American Airlines assigns a dispatcher to each of its flights. This is the first indication the dispatcher receives notice of any problem on Flight 11. MORNING NEWS, 6/13/2002; SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 6/14/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9 AND 86 However, Flight 11 is not a transatlantic flight, so why this particular dispatcher is notified is unclear. 8:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 11 IFF Signal Transmission Stops Flight 11 stops transmitting its IFF (identify friend or foe) beacon signal. 9/17/2001 (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Israeli Special-Ops Passenger Possibly Shot or Stabbed by Hijackers An FAA memo written on the evening of 9/11, and later leaked, will suggest that a man on Flight 11 is shot and killed by a gun before the plane crashes into the World Trade Center. The “Executive Summary,” based on information relayed by a flight attendant to the American Airlines Operation Center, states “that a passenger located in seat 10B [Satam Al Suqami] shot and killed a passenger in seat 9B [Daniel Lewin] at 9:20 a.m.” (Note that since Flight 11 crashes at 8:46, the time must be a typographical error, probably meaning 8:20). A report in Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz on September 17 will identify Lewin as a former member of the Israel Defense Force Sayeret Matkal, Israel’s most successful Special Operations unit. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 3/6/2002 Sayeret Matkal is a deep penetration unit that has been involved in assassinations, the theft of foreign signals intelligence materials, and the theft and destruction of foreign nuclear weaponry. YORKER, 10/29/2001 Lewin founded Akamai, a successful computer company, and his connections to Sayeret Matkal will remain hidden until the gun story becomes known. 9/15/2001 FAA and American Airline officials will later deny the gun story and suggest that Lewin is probably stabbed to death instead. POST, 3/2/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 3/6/2002 Officials assert that the leaked document was a “first draft,” and subsequently corrected, but decline to release the final draft, calling it “protected information.” However, an FAA official present when the memo is drafted will dispute the FAA’s claim, asserting that “the document was reviewed for accuracy by a number of people in the room, including myself and a couple of managers of the operations center.” 3/7/2002 This unnamed official is probably Bogdan Dzakovic, a leader of the FAA’s “red team” conducting covert security inspections. He will later tell the 9/11 Commission: (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Veers Off Course Flight 11 starts to veer dramatically off course. It now heads in a northwesterly direction toward Albany, New York. 9/11/2002 (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Flight Control Thinks Flight 11 May Be Hijacked? According to some reports, Boston flight control decides that Flight 11 has probably been hijacked, but apparently, it does not notify other flight control centers for another five minutes, and does not notify NORAD for approximately 20 minutes. YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001 ABC News will later say, “There doesn’t seem to have been alarm bells going off, flight controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There’s a gap there that will have to be investigated.” NEWS, 9/14/2001 (Note the conflicting account at 8:21 a.m. (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001) (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Attendant Ong’s Hijacking Account Forwarded to American Airlines Operations Center Nydia Gonzalez, an American Airlines supervisor with expertise on security matters, is patched in to a call with flight attendant Betty Ong on Flight 11. COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 At 8:21 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission (or 8:27 a.m., according to the Wall Street Journal), Gonzalez calls Craig Marquis, a manager at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas. Gonzalez holds the phone to Ong to one ear, and the phone to Marquis to the other. STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 9 Marquis quickly says, “I’m assuming they’ve declared an emergency. Let me get ATC [ air traffic control ] on here. Stand by.… Okay, we’re contacting the flight crew now and we’re… we’re also contacting ATC.” Gonzalez relays that Ong is saying the hijackers from seats 2A and 2B are in the cockpit with the pilots, and that there are no doctors on board. Gonzalez talks to Marquis continuously until Flight 11 crashes. While only the first four minutes of Ong’s call from Flight 11 are recorded by American Airlines (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001), all of Gonzalez’s call to Marquis will be recorded. Four minutes, of what is apparently a compilation from it, are later played before the 9/11 Commission. COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Controller Suspects Something Seriously Wrong with Flight 11, but NORAD Not Notified Boston flight controller Pete Zalewski, handling Flight 11, sees that the flight is off course and that the plane has turned off both transponder and radio. Zalewski later claims he turns to his supervisor and says, “Would you please come over here? I think something is seriously wrong with this plane. I don’t know what. It’s either mechanical, electrical, I think, but I’m not sure.” When asked if he suspected a hijacking at this point, he replies, “Absolutely not. No way.” According to the 9/11 Commission, “the supervisor instructed the controller Zalewski to follow standard operating procedures for handling a ‘no radio’ aircraft once the controller told the supervisor the transponder had been turned off.” Another flight controller, Tom Roberts, has another nearby American Airlines Flight try to contact Flight 11. There is still no response. The flight is now “drastically off course” but NORAD is still not notified. 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 This response contradicts flight control manager Glenn Michael’s assertion that Flight 11 was considered a possible hijacking as soon as the transponder was discovered turned off. 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Controllers Hear Flight 11 Hijacker Say, ‘We Have Some Planes,’ but Uncertain of Origin of Transmission Pete Zalewski. NBC Because the talkback button on Flight 11 has been activated, Boston Center air traffic controllers can hear a hijacker on board say to the passengers: “We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you’ll be OK. We are returning to the airport.” GLOBE, 11/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 19 Air traffic controller Pete Zalewski recognizes this as a foreign, Middle Eastern-sounding voice, but does not make out the specific words “we have some planes.” He responds, “Who’s trying to call me?” Seconds later, in the next transmission, the hijacker continues: “Nobody move. Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.” YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; MSNBC, 9/9/2006 Bill Peacock, the FAA director of air traffic services, later claims, “We didn’t know where the transmission came from, what was said and who said it.” David Canoles, the FAA’s manager of air traffic evaluations and investigations, adds: “The broadcast wasn’t attributed to a flight. Nobody gave a flight number.” TIMES, 9/11/2002 Similarly, an early FAA report will state that both these transmissions came from “an unknown origin.” AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 Zalewski asks for an assistant to help listen to the transmissions coming from the plane, and puts its frequency on speakers so others at Boston Center can hear. Because Zalewski didn’t understand the initial hijacker communication from Flight 11, the manager of Boston Center instructs the center’s quality assurance specialist to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. They do this, and by about 9:03 a.m. a Boston manager will report having deciphered what was said in the first hijacker transmission (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; MSNBC, 9/9/2006 Fellow Boston controller Don Jeffroy also hears the tape of the hijacker transmissions, though he doesn’t state at what time. He says: “I heard exactly what Pete Zalewski heard. And we had to actually listen to it a couple of times just to make sure that we were hearing what we heard.” 9/11/2002 At some point, Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, gets word of the “We have some planes” message, and later says the phrase haunts him all morning. American Airlines Executive Vice President for Operations Gerard Arpey is also informed of the “strange transmissions from Flight 11” at some point prior to when it crashes at 8:46 a.m. TODAY, 8/13/2002 Boston Center will receive a third transmission from Flight 11 about ten minutes later (see (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Bill Peacock, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, David Canoles, Pete Zalewski Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11 (Before 8:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijackers Identified by Seat Locations Having been told by flight attendant Amy Sweeney the seat locations of three hijackers (see 8:22 a.m. September 11, 2001), American Airlines Flight service manager Michael Woodward orders a colleague at Boston’s Logan Airport to look up those seat locations on the reservations computer. The names, addresses, phone numbers, and credit cards of these hijackers are quickly identified: Abdulaziz Alomari is in 9G, Mohamed Atta is in 9D, and Satam Al Suqami is in 10B. 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey notes that from this information, American Airlines officials monitoring the call would probably have known or assumed right away that the hijacking was connected to al-Qaeda. NEWS, 7/18/2002; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 2/15/2004 (8:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Realizes with Certainty that Flight 11 Has Been Hijacked According to Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, the center initially thought Flight 11 “was a catastrophic electrical failure and… was diverting to New York” (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 10/19/2002 However, at about 8:24 a.m., controllers heard two radio transmissions from it, with the voice of a hijacker declaring, “We have some planes” (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). Pete Zalewski, who is handling Flight 11, says that after the second of these: “I immediately knew something was very wrong. And I knew it was a hijack.” He alerts his supervisor. Lino Martins, another Boston air traffic controller, says, “the supervisor came over, and that’s when we realized something was serious.” SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 However, two senior FAA officials—Bill Peacock and David Canoles—later say that the hijacker transmissions were not attributed to a flight, so controllers didn’t know their origin. TIMES, 9/11/2002 An early FAA report will similarly refer to them as having come “from an unknown origin.” But right away, the center begins notifying the chain of command that a suspected hijacking is taking place (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 However, some reports claim that controllers decided Flight 11 was probably hijacked earlier than this, by about 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Pete Zalewski, Lino Martins Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Starts Notifying Chain of Command Boston flight control begins notifying the chain of command that a suspected hijacking of Flight 11 is in progress. Those notified include the center’s own facility manager, the FAA’s New England Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Burlington, Massachusetts, and the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia (see 8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 11 According to the 9/11 Commission, this is consistent with FAA protocol: “From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller’s first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge. The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA headquarters.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 458 But according to Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Command Center, “the protocol was in place that the center that reported the hijacking would notify the military.… I go back to 1964, where I began my air traffic career, and they have always followed the same protocol.” COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 Yet Boston Center supposedly will not contact NORAD about Flight 11 until about 12 minutes later (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Already about ten minutes have passed since controllers first noticed a loss of contact with Flight 11 (see (8:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Boston reportedly also contacts several other air traffic control centers about the suspected hijacking at this time (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Key Day of 9/11 Events (8:25 a.m.-8:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Military Liaison Arrives Late at Boston Center, Learns of First Hijacking Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, arrives at work an hour late and is informed of the hijacking of Flight 11. AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001; WAMU, 8/3/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 32-33 Scoggins is an experienced air traffic controller and specializes in airspace, procedures, and military operations. He is responsible for managing operating agreements between the Boston Center and other air traffic control facilities, and between Boston Center and the military. He is also responsible for generating the military schedules that keep FAA facilities synchronized with military airspace requirements, and has therefore developed personal relationships with most of the military units in his region. 2008, PP. 32-33 Arrives One Hour Late - In a 2006 radio interview, Scoggins will recall that he arrives at work one hour late, saying, “That morning I actually came in, took an hour early on the front of my shift, so I didn’t get in until 8:30.” 8/3/2006 But in a statement that will be provided to the 9/11 Commission, he says he arrives at the Boston Center slightly earlier, at “about 8:25 a.m.” AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001 When he enters the building, a colleague tells him about the hijacking of Flight 11. 2008, PP. 33 Heads to Credit Union - Rather than going immediately to help deal with the hijacking, Scoggins heads to the credit union at the center. He will recall, “I wasn’t in a rush because when hijacks do occur, sometimes too many people try to get involved, but instead they just get in the way.” Mentions that Hijacked Plane Could Hit a Building - When he gets to the credit union, Scoggins decides he should go to the center’s traffic management unit, to make sure that fighter jets are launched in response to the hijacking. As he will later recall, he says to an employee at the credit union that “if it really came to it,” and fighter jets “had to stop the hijack from hitting a building or something, there wasn’t much fighters could do.” AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/20/2001 Updated on Hijacking - Scoggins then heads to the center’s operational floor, arriving there at about 8:35. 8/3/2006; GRIFFIN, 2007, PP. 335 He goes to the traffic management unit and the desk of Daniel Bueno, who is the unit’s supervisor. Bueno brings Scoggins up to date on the details of the hijacking. He tells him: “It sounds real. We heard a Mideastern or Arabic voice on radio. They’ve also turned off the transponder to prevent the hijack code from appearing.” Bueno says the Boston Center controllers are still tracking the primary radar return for Flight 11, but they lack information on its altitude. According to author Lynn Spencer, it occurs to Scoggins that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) might be able to provide altitude information for Flight 11, “because the FAA radar system filters out certain altitude information that NEADS gets.” He will therefore phone NEADS as soon as he arrives at his station (see (8:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 2008, PP. 33 Entity Tags: Daniel Bueno, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Colin Scoggins Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11 References Taken from historycommons.org Timeline. Category:Timeline